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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-2088 
____________ 
 
STEVEN LEBOON, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO. 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 15-cv-05904) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert       
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 12, 2016 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 12, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
Steven LeBoon appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint and denying his motions for sanctions.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
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LeBoon was hired by the Alan McIlvain Company (“AMC”) in September 2008, 
and terminated from his position there as Human Resources Manager on May 8, 2009.  
On May 9, 2012, he filed a complaint pro se in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against AMC, alleging violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
in that he was terminated just after he had suffered a workplace injury.  The parties’ 
motions for summary judgment were denied and the case was set for trial.  On the second 
day of trial, LeBoon called to explain that he was having car trouble and could not get to 
court that day.  The District Judge assigned to the case declared a mistrial and ordered 
LeBoon to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  
Specifically, the District Judge ordered LeBoon to provide proof of his car troubles.  
After reviewing LeBoon’s response, the District Judge found that his claims of car 
trouble were unsubstantiated and that he could have taken public transportation to court.  
LeBoon’s case was dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Poulis v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).  We affirmed on appeal, see LeBoon v. 
Alan McIlvain Co., 628 F. App’x 98 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 On October 29, 2015, LeBoon filed a pro se complaint in the Eastern District 
against Zurich American Insurance Company, AMC’s liability insurer, alleging bad faith 
in connection with his employment discrimination action, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
8371, common law bad faith, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  LeBoon’s allegations were premised on Zurich’s conduct while defending 
AMC.  Specifically, he claimed that Zurich, as AMC’s counsel and insurer, failed to 
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make any good faith offers to settle the employment litigation and thus breached a duty 
owed to him.  LeBoon asserted that “Zurich was careless in unnecessary litigation using 
over $1 million [and] leaving ZERO pennies for me.”  Form Complaint, at ¶ III(C).  
LeBoon also alleged a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 {“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.  
 Zurich filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), attaching as an exhibit a copy of the 
liability policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company to Alan McIlvain 
Company, effective February 14, 2009 to February 14, 2010.  Zurich argued that its only 
obligation under the liability policy was to defend and indemnify AMC, an obligation it 
executed successfully, and that, because LeBoon had no basis for arguing that he was an 
Insured under the policy, he had no basis for maintaining a civil action against Zurich 
based on allegations of bad faith.  LeBoon’s common law claims failed for the same 
reason, Zurich argued, and ERISA had no application whatever to the case because the 
liability policy at issue clearly was not an “employee welfare benefits plan” subject to 
ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
Eight days after Zurich filed its motion to dismiss on the civil docket, LeBoon 
filed a motion for sanctions against Zurich alleging that its counsel failed to properly 
serve him with the motion to dismiss.  LeBoon sought a default judgment in the amount 
of $1,000,000.00.  After Zurich responded to LeBoon’s motion for sanctions, asserting 
that counsel for Zurich had properly served LeBoon via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, at his 
address of record, LeBoon filed a second motion for sanctions.   
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In an order entered on April 18, 2016, the District Court granted Zurich’s motion 
to dismiss the complaint and denied LeBoon’s motions for sanctions.  Applying Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), the Court found that the certificate accompanying 
Zurich’s motion to dismiss stated that the motion had been served via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, to LeBoon at 426 Buchanan Road, Perkasie, PA 18944, and that this certification 
was sufficient to establish the presumption of regularity that an addressee has received a 
properly addressed and mailed pleading.  The Court further found that LeBoon had not 
provided any evidence that he had changed his address, and his unsupported and 
conclusory assertion that he never received Zurich’s motion to dismiss was insufficient to 
show noncompliance by Zurich with Rule 5.  The District Court went on to conclude that, 
considering the motion to dismiss on the merits, LeBoon’s complaint failed to state a 
plausible claim for relief.  After reviewing the terms of the policy, the Court found that 
LeBoon was not an Insured within the meaning of the policy.  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded, Zurich owed no duty to LeBoon to settle the employment discrimination case, 
and thus none of his claims survived Zurich’s motion to dismiss. 
 LeBoon appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  After briefing 
was complete, LeBoon filed a motion to stay this appeal pending the outcome of 
discovery he says he is conducting in a case he has recently filed against AMC in the 
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.  Zurich responded in opposition to the motion, 
and also submitted a letter to the Court.  LeBoon then filed a reply and a supplemental 
motion, revising his request for a stay. 
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 We will affirm.  We hold first that the District Court properly determined that 
LeBoon failed to overcome the presumption of service of Zurich’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint, and thus properly denied LeBoon’s motions for sanctions.  A District Court’s 
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.  See United States v. 6.45 Acres of Land, 
409 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2005).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C) provides 
that a motion is properly served by “mailing it to the person’s last known address -- in 
which event service is complete upon mailing.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C).  The District 
Court did not clearly err in finding that Zurich complied with Rule 5’s service 
requirements.  “The common law has long recognized a presumption that an item 
properly mailed was received by the addressee.”  In re: Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 311 
F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2002).  Once a certificate of service is filed asserting that a 
pleading was properly addressed, had sufficient postage, and was served by being placed 
in the U.S. mail, a presumption of regularity arises that the addressee received the 
pleading.  Id.  Beyond his denial of receipt of Zurich’s motion to dismiss, LeBoon offered 
no explanation or evidence, such as a recent change of address or problems with receipt 
of mail, to rebut the presumption of receipt of the motion to dismiss.   
 We further hold that the District Court properly granted Zurich’s motion to 
dismiss LeBoon’s complaint.  When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court 
may consider a document explicitly relied upon in the complaint without converting the 
motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion.  In re: Rockefeller Center Properties, 
Inc. Securities Litigation, 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999).  A Court may also consider 
an “undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion 
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to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.”  Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  Here, 
the District Court properly relied upon the terms of Zurich’s liability insurance policy in 
ruling on the motion to dismiss.   
Review of a District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) is plenary.  A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the factual 
allegations contained in the complaint.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a 
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009).  We look for “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence of the necessary elements of” a claim for relief.  Phillips v. County 
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).   
In that LeBoon plainly is not an Insured under the liability policy, he failed to state 
a plausible claim for relief on his allegations of bad faith.  Under the unambiguous terms 
of the liability policy, Zurich’s only obligation was to provide for the defense and 
indemnity of covered claims against AMC.  It had no obligation to LeBoon, as AMC’s 
adversary, to settle the employment litigation, and thus his bad faith claims cannot 
survive Zurich’s motion to dismiss, just as the District Court concluded.  See Strutz v. 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 609 A.2d 569, 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he duty 
to negotiate a settlement in good faith arises from the insurance policy and is owed to the 
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insured, not to a third-party claimant.”).  In addition, the liability policy clearly is not an 
“employee welfare benefits plan” subject to ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).1  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
LeBoon’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and denying his motions for sanctions.  
We will deny LeBoon’s motion and supplemental motion to stay this appeal because 
additional discovery will not establish that Zurich owed him a duty to settle the 
employment litigation.  
 
                                                                
1 Zurich notes in its brief that LeBoon previously filed ERISA actions in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania against AMC’s group disability benefits insurer, asserting a 
wrongful denial of long-term disability benefits under AMC’s employee benefit plan, see 
LeBoon v. Allan McIlvain Co., et al., D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-004035, and LeBoon v. Unum 
Group, D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-07069.  Appellee’s Brief, at 5. 
